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|
THE LAW
OF DEFAMATION AND THE INTERNET by |
Update 5
Mickelberg
v 6PR Southern Cross Radio Pty Ltd [2001] WASC 150
Australian
decision concerning whether the publication of a radio interview via the
Internet is deemed to be libel by s 206 of the Broadcasting Services Act 1992
(Cth).
The plaintiffs brought an action in relation to an
allegedly defamatory interview which was broadcast on a
The distinction between libel and slander remains relevant
in
Section 206 of the Broadcasting Services Act 1992 (Cth)
(‘the BSA’) provides that ‘For the purposes of the law of defamation, the
broadcasting or datacasting of matter is taken to be publication of the matter
in a permanent form.’ That provision has been interpreted as deeming defamatory
radio and television programmes to be libel for the purposes of Australian
defamation law.
Hasluck J of the Western Australian
Supreme Court ‘inclined to the view’ that the publication of a radio interview
via the Internet does not amount to the ‘broadcasting’ of the interview for the
purposes of s 206 of the BSA. His Honour’s conclusion was based, in essence, on
his view that audio-visual material made available via the Internet does not
fall within the definition of ‘broadcasting service’ in s 6(1) of the BSA, and
that such material therefore falls outside the ambit of s 206. Hasluck J
granted the plaintiffs leave to replead the cause of action based on the
Internet publication.
This decision is, with respect, incorrect and should not be
followed. While it is true that Internet publications fall outside the scope of
the definition of ‘broadcasting service’ in s 6(1) of the BSA, it does not
follow that Internet publications cannot amount to the ‘broadcasting of matter’
for the purposes of s 206. The qualifications to the definition of a
‘broadcasting service’ in paragraphs (a)–(c) of s 6(1), which were relied
upon by his Honour, impose a limit on the ‘services’ which are regulated by the
BSA, but should not be seen as affecting the meaning of the word
‘broadcasting’. That word should be given its ordinary English meaning. For the
reasons identified in paras 4.16–4.22 of The Law of Defamation and the Internet, the better view is that where material published via the
Internet is in the nature of a television or radio programme, it constitutes
the ‘broadcasting of matter’ for the purposes of s 206, even though that
material does not satisfy the definition of a ‘broadcasting service’ in 6(1).
A copy of the decision is available by following
this link.
DISCLAIMER
The author makes no warranties or
representations concerning the accuracy of the information contained on this
web page. To the maximum extent permitted by law, the author accepts no
liability for any direct, indirect or consequential damages resulting from the
use of this web page or reliance on the information contained on it. Links to
other web sites are provided in good faith and for information only. The author
disclaims any responsibility for the materials contained in any web site linked
to this web page.
© Matthew
Collins 2002